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PATENT INFRINGEMENT PREVENTION AND
THE ADVANCEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY:
APPLICATION OF 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) TO
SOFTWARE AND "VIRTUAL COMPONENTS"
William R. Thornewell 11*
INTRODUCTION
Obtaining a patent has relatively little value unless it is enforceable
against infringers. A patent does not bestow a right to practice an
invention, but rather only a right to exclude others from practicing the
invention.' Therefore, patent holders need to be able to stop others
from infringing their patents by preventing the copying and selling of
their inventions. However, prior to the enactment of 35 U.S.C. §
271(f),2 a loophole had developed in patent law allowing domestic
manufacturers to avoid infringement liability by simply having the
components of a patented invention made in the United States and
then assembled in a foreign country.3 Even though § 271(f) was
enacted to prevent this practice,4 a similar loophole may be
developing with respect to software and "virtual component"
technologies.
Part I of this Note contains the necessary background information,
which includes the history and development of § 271(f) as well as a
definition and description of software and virtual component
technology. Part II discusses recent cases, the development of the
controversy, and the current state of the law, including the recent U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision in Eolas
Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.6 Part III discusses what possible
* J.D. Candidate, 2006, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (indicating that a natent grants the "right to
exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention").
2. Patent Law Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, § 101, 98 Stat. 3383
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)); see infra note 21 and accompanying text (quoting text
of statute).
3. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972).
4. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing the legislative history of § 271(f)).
5. Virtual components are parts that are created on a computer using computer
design software. For a more detailed discussion of "software" and "virtual
component" technology as they relate to this Note, see infra Part I.B.2.
6. No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005).
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effects the Eolas decision may have on the application of § 271(f) to
software and virtual components, and then urges the adoption of an
interpretation of § 271(f) that would encompass these technologies. 7
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW AND TECHNOLOGY
A. Development of the Law
1. Enactment of § 271(f)
A discussion of § 271(f) jurisprudence begins with a discussion of
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,8 the Supreme Court case
that prompted Congress to enact § 271(f). 9 In this case, Deepsouth
was manufacturing parts of a patented shrimp-deveining machine and
then shipping them to customers as parts of a kit that could later be
assembled in a foreign country.1"
As this case preceded the enactment of § 271(f), the Court was left
to analyze Deepsouth's actions under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)." At the
time Deepsouth was decided, § 271(a) provided as follows: "'Except
as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes,
uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States during
the term of the patent therefor, [directly] infringes the patent.'...
Evaluating Deepsouth's actions under § 271(a), the focus of the
Court's inquiry was, "did Deepsouth 'make' (and then sell) something
cognizable under the patent law as the patented invention, or did it
'make' (and then sell) something that fell short of infringement?"' 3
The Supreme Court refused to interpret the term "make" to include a
substantial manufacture of the parts, as the Fifth Circuit did below. 4
Instead, the Court, finding that Deepsouth's actions did not infringe,
reaffirmed a Second Circuit holding that "unassembled export of the
elements of an invention did not infringe the patent."' 5
7. See infra Part III.
8. 406 U.S. at 518.
9. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
10. See Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 523-24.
11. See id. at 527 (indicating that, in order to prevail, Laitram had to prove direct
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000)).
12. Id. at 522 (Quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)). Section 271(a) was later amended "by
inserting 'offers to sell,' after 'uses' and "by inserting 'or imoorts into the United
States any patented invention' after 'the United States'." Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 533(a), 108 Stat. 4988 (1994) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)).
13. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 527.
14. See id. at 527-28: see also Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d
936, 938-39 (5th Cir. 1971).
15. Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 529 (citing Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d
626, 628 (2d Cir. 1935)).
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The Court did not agree with the criticism that its "conclusion [was]
derived from too narrow and technical an interpretation of the
statute" and that the statute should be read more broadly. 6 The
Court stated that it would require "a clear and certain signal from
Congress" before expanding the patent law.17 However, Justice
Blackmun, with whom three other Justices joined in dissent, noted
that this narrow reading "has opened the way to deny the holder of [a]
United States combination patent the benefits of his invention with
respect to sales to foreign purchasers."18 The dissent agreed with the
Court of Appeals' opinion, which expressed concern that the
conclusion reached in the present case created a loophole that would
allow an infringer to set up shop next door to a patent-protected
inventor whose product enjoys a substantial foreign market and
deprive him of this valuable business. If this Constitutional
protection is to be fully effectuated, it must extend to an infringer
who manufactures in the United States and then captures the
foreign markets from the patentee. The Constitutional mandate
cannot be limited to just manufacturing and selling within the
United States. The infringer would then be allowed to reap the
fruits of the American economy-technology, labor, materials,
etc.-but would not be subject to the responsibilities of the
American patent laws. We cannot permit an infringer to enjoy these
benefits and then be allowed to strip away a portion of the
patentee's protection. 19
In fact, it was the creation of this loophole that prompted Congress
to enact § 271(f) to close it.2° Section 271(f) provides as follows:
(1) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied
in or from the United States all or a substantial portion of the
components of a patented invention, where such components are
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce
the combination of such components outside of the United States in
a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.
(2) Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied
in or from the United States any component of a patented invention
16. Id. at 529-30.
17. Id. at 531.
18. Id. at 533 (Blackmun. J.. dissentine).
19. Id. at 534 (quoting Laitram, 443 F.2d at 939).
20. See Section-By-Section Analysis: Patent Law Amendments of 1984, 130 Con2.
Rec. 28.065. 28.069 (submission of Rep. Kastenmeier) ("This proposal responds to the
United States Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth Packiniz Co. v. Laitram Coro..
406 U.S. 518 (1972), concerning the need for a legislative solution to close a loophole
in patent law."), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828. In addition to making
oral statements, Representative Kastenmeier submitted a section-by-section analysis
of H.R. 6286, which became the Patent Law Amendments of 1984, in lieu of a lengthy




that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention
and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined
in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or
adapted and intending that such component will be combined
outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within the United States, shall
be liable as an infringer."
According to the legislative history, this change in the patent law is
in line with the constitutional mandate of the patent system.2 The
legislative history of § 271(f) reads in pertinent part:
Part of the [Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary's] job is
to secure for the owners of intellectual property, including patent
holders, a workable, efficient, and vigorous set of laws to protect
their creations. It is only through implementation of the
constitutional mandate of encouraging the sciences and the useful
arts that we will be able to spur the inventive spirit that has made
our country a world leader. Indeed, our ability to foster innovation
is a central element to our national security ....
... However, without enactment of these housekeeping-oriented
measures, the patent system would not be responsive to the
challenges of a changing world and the public would not benefit
from the release of creative genius.23
The section-by-section analysis of the bill stated that
Section 101 makes two major changes in the patent law to avoid
encouraging manufacturing outside the United States.
The second major change made by section 101[, the addition of §
271(f),] will prevent copiers from avoiding U.S. patents by supplying
components of a patented product in this country so that the
assembly of the components may be completed abroad. This
proposal responds to the United States Supreme Court decision in
[Deepsouth], concerning the need for a legislative solution to close a
loophole in patent law.2 4
The legislative history reveals that the objectives of the
amendments were to make the patent system more "responsive to the
21. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
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challenges of a changing world '25 and to "avoid encouraging
manufacturing outside the United States.
26
2. Early Application of § 271(f)
Some of the earliest cases to address the scope of § 271(f) dealt with
mechanical devices.27 One such case is Smith International, Inc. v.
Hughes Tool Co. 28 which concerned the sale of O-ring drill bits to
foreign customers. 29 The issue facing the Smith court was whether the
exportation of O-rings and manufacturing specifications for the drill
bits constituted infringement under § 271(f).30 However, the court
declined to rule on this issue because it found that there was no
evidence that any shipments had occurred after November 8, 1984, the
date on which § 271(f) became effective.31
Another early case, T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, involved the
export of a pipeline inspector, which is a mechanical device.32 The
district court concluded with relatively little difficulty that § 271(f) was
applicable.33 The statute's applicability to mechanical devices should
be obvious3 4 because Congress enacted § 271(f) in direct response to
Deepsouth, a case involving mechanical devices.35
3. The Metes and Bounds of § 271(f): Attempts to Define the Scope
of Coverage
Later cases tested the limits of § 271(f) by attempting to apply the
statute to technologies36 and types of patents37 different from those at
25. Id.
26. Id. (submission of Rep. Kastenmeier).
27. See, e.g., T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Lavmon. 723 F. Supp. 587 (N.D. Okla. 1989);
Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., No. CV 72-1231, 1986 WL 4795, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 12, 1986), vacated as moot, 839 F.2d 663 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
28. 1986 WL 4795, at *1.
29. Id. at *31.
30. Id. (discussing whether the "provision of plans" occurred after enactment of §
271(f) in order to determine if § 271(f) was implicated).
31. Id.
32. See T.D. Williamson, 723 F. Supp. at 590.
33. See id. at 592-93.
34. See Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law
to Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), 25 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 557, 567 (2004)
(noting that application of § 271(f) to mechanical devices should be
"straightforward").
35. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 519 (1972)
(involving shrimp-deveining equipment); supra note 24 and accomnanvin2 text.
36. See. e.z. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 319
(D. Del. 1999) (involving chemical compounds).
37. See, e.z.. Standard Havens Prods.. Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (involving a process oatent): Aerogroup Int'l. Inc. v. Marlboro
Footworks, Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (involving a design patent).
28192005]
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issue in Deepsouth.38  The statute itself limits coverage to
"components of a patented invention."39  However, it was unclear
what could be considered a component.4" With no clear definition in
place, it was uncertain whether § 271(f) applied to chemical
components or design or process patents.41 Therefore, the courts were
left to determine the proper scope of coverage.
The issue of whether chemical compounds could be considered
components arose in W. R. Grace & Co. - Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., a case
involving patented chemical compounds used for reducing sulfur
oxide emissions.42 The defendant in this case argued that § 271(f) was
inapplicable to chemical compounds because it was enacted
specifically to overrule Deepsouth, a case that involved mechanical
components. 43 However, the court rejected this argument, ruling that
[t]he plain language of the statute limits its application only to a
"component of a patented invention." Nowhere in the statute or its
legislative history is there a limitation to components of machines
and other structural combinations. A contrary holding, refusing to
apply the statute to chemical compositions, would be tantamount to
legislating additional language to a statute. That simply is not
warranted.'
The district court, refusing to read in such a limitation, found that §
271(f) included chemical compounds as components. 4' Another
district court found that § 271(f) similarly applied to components of
drug compounds.46
However, while some courts have been willing to readily apply §
271(f) to patents for machines47 and broadly interpret it to include
chemical compounds,48 other courts have refused to expand § 271(f) to
include design 49 and process patents within its scope.50  A design
38. Deepsouth concerned a composition patent for a mechanical shrimp-deveining
machine. See supra note 35.
39. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000).
40. See, e.g.. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.. No. 95 CIV
8833, 2001 WL 1263299, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001); W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at
320.
41. See, e.g., Standard Havens Prods.. 953 F.2d at 1374 (involving a Drocess
oatent): W.R. Grace. 60 F. Supt. 2d at 320 (involving a chemical compound);
AerogrouD. 955 F. Supp. at 232 (involving a design patent).
42. W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
43. Id. at 320.
44. Id. at 321.
45. Id.
46. See Bristol-Mvers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 CIV 8833,
2001 WL 1263299. at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19. 2001).
47. See, e.g., T.D. Williamson, Inc. v. Laymon, 723 F. Supp. 587, 592-93 (N.D.
Okla. 1989).
48. See W.R. Grace. 60 F. Surn. 2d at 320-21.
49. See Aeroroup Int'l. Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks. Ltd.. 955 F. Supp. 220, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to apply § 271(f) to a design patent).
2820 [Vol. 73
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patent only covers the "look" or outer appearance of an object; that
is, it only covers the configuration and ornamentation of the outer
surfaces of the object rather than its function.5 A process patent
covers a process for achieving a desired result.2 A common reasoning
adopted by the courts for not applying § 271(f) to design and process
patents is that these types of patents by their nature lack
components. 3
In Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc.,5" a case
involving a patent for a method of asphalt production, the Federal
Circuit indicated simply and with little discussion that it "[did] not find
the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (1988) implicated."55 However,
the district court in Enpat, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.56 provided some
reasoning as to why § 271(f) does not apply to process patents.
Another case, Synaptic Pharmaceutical Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc.,
cited Enpat and stated the following:
50. See Enpat. Inc. v. Microsoft Cor. 6 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Va. 1998)
(declining to apply § 271(f) to a process patent).
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000) ("Whoever invents any new, original and
ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject
to the conditions and reauirements of this title.").
52. See id. § 100(b) ("The term 'process' means Process, art or method, and
includes a new use of a known Process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter.
or material."): id. § 101 ("Whoever invents or discovers anv new and useful Process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful imorovement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.").
53. See En at. 6 F. SuD. 2d at 539 (indicating that the method Patent "[hadi no
'comoonents' for purposes of § 271(f)"): Aerozrouv, 955 F. Supp. at 232 (noting that
the design Patent "[had] no 'component parts,"' and therefore, is not covered by §
271(f)); see also AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.. No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640.
at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5. 2004) (indicating that design and method Patents do not have
components and therefore do not implicate § 271(f)); Fisch & Allen, supra note 34. at
571-72 & n.69 ("Courts have refused to aplv § 271(f) to such design and method
Patents because courts believe that design and method Patents lack the requisite
'component' parts that typically are present in mechanical inventions."). But see Eolas
Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *13 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2,
2005) (indicating that a process patent could be covered by § 271(f)).
54. 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (involving U.S. Patent 4,787,938 (issued Nov.
29, 1988)); see also U.S. Patent 4,787,938 (issued Nov. 29, 1988) ("[Claim] 1. A
method for continuously producing an asphaltic composition from asphalt and
aggregates, the steps of said method comprising .. .
55. Standard Havens Prods.,953 F.2d at 1374.
56. 6 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
57. See id. at 539. In support of its conclusion, the court stated that
[like the asphalt Process in Standard Havens or the shoe design in
Aerogroup, Plaintiffs' Patent describes the steps reouired to accomolish a
Particular task rather than the composition of a Patented phvsical product.
While it is true that anv Process involves the use of phvsical obiects, this
alone is not enough to bring a method Patent within the Purview of § 271(f).
as the above cases illustrate. We conclude that plaintiffs' patent has no
"components" for purposes of § 271(f).
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In Enpat, the District Court reasoned that the express language
singling out process patents for protection in § 271(g) indicated that
"Congress knew how to protect against foreign use of process
patents, and chose to limit such protection to uses which result in the
introduction of products into the United States." The Court went
on to note that because processes were not explicitly included in the
text of the statute, "the language and legislative history of § 271(f)
demonstrate an exclusive focus on the sale of components patented
in the United States for combination into a finished product,
apparatus, or invention abroad." Anticipating... arguments that a
process also involves the combination of materials, the court stated
that "[w]hile it is true that any process involves the use of physical
objects, this alone is not enough to bring a method patent within the
purview of § 271(f).' 58
Thus, based on a lack of language in § 271(f) indicating applicability to
process patents, together with express process patent language in §
271(g), courts have refused to include process patents within the scope
of § 271(f).5 9
Unlike the issue facing the court in W.R. Grace-whether a
chemical could be considered a "component" 6°0-courts were faced
with the fundamental question of whether design and process patents
have components.6 While a process patent may involve the use of
some components, the patent only gives protection to the process
itself and not the components used to facilitate it, and therefore, the
Enpat court reasoned that § 271(f) does not apply.62 Courts have
58. Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J.
2002) (citations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539).
Section 271(2) states the following:
Whoever without authority imoorts into the United States or offers to
sell, sells, or uses within the United States a Product which is made bv a
Process patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the
imoortation, offer to sell, sale. or use of the Product occurs during the term
of such Process Patent. In an action for infringement of a Process Patent, no
remedy mav be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial
use or retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedv under this
title for infringement on account of the imoortation or other use, offer to
sell, or sale of that Product. A Product which is made bv a Patented process
will. for Purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after-
(1) it is materially changed bv subsequent Processes: or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.
35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000).
59. See Synaptic Pharm., 265 F. Supp. 2d at 464; Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539. But
see Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *13 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 2, 2005) (indicating that a process patent could be covered by § 271(f)).
60. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 53.
62. See Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539 ("While it is true that any process involves the
use of physical objects, this alone is not enough to bring a method patent within the
purview of § 271(f) ...."). The Enpat court also indicated that "had Congress
intended to prohibit U.S. companies from exporting products which allow foreign
[Vol. 732822
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similarly found that § 271(f) does not apply to design patents because
they do not have the requisite "components. 6 3
B. Technological Analysis of Software and Virtual Components
1. Software
Generally, the exportation of software for copying is accomplished
using two mediums: "golden masters" and encrypted electronic
transmission. 64 A golden master is, in essence, a CD containing
software.65 Once the software is developed, it is burned onto a disk
using a laser, and it is this single disk, called a golden master, that is
shipped abroad and used to create copies of the software that are later
installed on computers.66 Another method for exporting the software
skips the process of burning it onto a disk and simply sends the
software in the form of an encrypted electronic transmission. 67 This
electronic transmission is received, decrypted, and then used to make
copies of the software abroad.68
2. Virtual Components
While a case involving § 271(f) and virtual components-parts that
are created on a computer using computer design software69-has not
companies to make unauthorized use of patented methods, it could have done so in
clear, unambiguous language like that found in § 271(2)." Id.
63. Aerogroup Int'l. Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks. Ltd.. 955 F. Sum). 220, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding no liability for infringing a shoe sole design patent because.
according to the court, design patents do not have components, and therefore are not
covered by § 271(f)).
64. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
65. See id. at *1 n.5.
66. See id. at *1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. "Virtual component" is actually used in the integrated circuit industry, which
happens to be the technology involved in Pellegrini, the case that was the motivation
for writing this Note. See Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1114-15
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 642 (2004); see also Richard Goering, Giga Scale
Tweaks IC Prototyping, Electronic Engineering Times, Apr. 26, 2004, at 32; Kathy
Werner & Tom Anderson, Specs Eye Functional Verification, Quality, Electronic
Engineering Times, July 12, 2004, at 45. So called "virtual component exchanges"
have been created, which facilitate the sale of intellectual property ("IP") associated
with integrated circuit design, also know as an intellectual property exchange. See
Goering, supra; Werner & Anderson, supra. In many respects, virtual components as
used in the integrated circuit context are similar to virtual components as defined in
this Note and would fall under this Note's broader definition. However, because of
the author's background in mechanical engineering and hands-on experience with
three-dimensional printing technology to create physical mechanical parts (or, more
appropriately, hands-off experience, because the only thing the author used his hands
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yet come before the courts,7° the technology involved is in some
respects similar to that involved in software cases. 71 The technology of
virtual components blurs the line between software and traditional
mechanical devices.72 The problem arises because of advances in both
computer-aided design ("CAD") software and manufacturing
technology, which are bringing the processes of design and
manufacturing closer to full and seamless integration.73
Under the current state of the technology, it is now possible for an
engineer to design a component on a computer using CAD software
and then print out a three-dimensional part.74 First, the engineer
"manufactures" the part on a computer by drilling holes and cutting
features on the virtual component using the software functions.
Once the part is finished on the computer, the file is sent to a special
for in the process was to control a mouse to create and then e-mail the virtual parts
from a computer), this Note focuses on using computers to create mechanical parts.
70. Arguably, Pellegrini may have involved some form of virtual component
because it involved designs for integrated circuit chips; however, the court did not
address the issue in depth. See Pellegrini, 375 F.3d at 1114-15; see also supra note 69.
71. See infra notes 72, 75, 79-80, 122, 136, 234 and accompanying text (discussing
how both software and virtual components can be "manufactured" on computers and
how they can be sent vast distances via electronic transmission for replication).
72. See CNC Software: Keeping Everything Virtual, Architecture, May 2003, at
109, 109 ("If a computer model is built with a program that is compatible with milling
software, the project can go straight from design development to physical output.");
see also infra note 76 (describing computer numerical control ("CNC") machining and
three-dimensional printing, two main processes that are used to convert virtual
components into physical parts).
73. Julia Mandell, CNC State of Mind: CNC and Other Manufacturing
Technologies Allow for a Smooth Transition from 3-D Computer Modeling to Finished
Product, Architecture, May 2003, at 108, 109 ("'With CNC, we are compressing
design-to-build into one seamless efficiency,' [says William Massie, a New York City-
based architect who has been working intensively with CNC technology since
1991]."); see also Stephen Ellerin, The Art and Science of "3D Printing," Emedia-
The Digital Studio Mag., May 2004, at 14, 14 (indicating that "[n]ow 'rapid
prototyping'-or '3D printing'-has drastically shortened the path from mind to
matter"). It has also been indicated that rapid prototyping technology eliminates the
"need for human intervention between the 3-D architectural model and the final
product." Mandell, supra, at 108.
74. See Ellerin, supra note 73, at 14 (describing how CAD files can be sent to a 3D
printer, which turns the file into a working three-dimensional model). The models
that are "printed out" are functional, meaning that, in complex designs, the "screws
turn, pistons slide, and you can test" the designs. Id.
75. This process is done using computer-aided design ("CAD") software on a
computer and then the part is saved as a file. See Lawrence S. Gould, A Couple of
Cool Tools for Designers, Automotive Design & Production, May 2004, at 66, 66
(describing how parts are created using their geometric descriptions, such as how a
shaft is created by extruding a circle along a line or how a spring is created by
extruding a cross section along a helix); see also CAD/CAM Software & Control
Systems, Tooling & Production, Aug. 2004, at 72, 74 (explaining that with CAD/CAM
software a user can "machine" a model by simply using a computer mouse); Sara
Tambascio, The Virtual World Meets the Factory, Tooling & Production, Apr. 2004,
at 38, 38 (describing how "digital manufacturing" can be used to discover and correct
any problems with designs before "any metal is cut").
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machine that can "print out" the part.76 The "printed" parts can be
made out of various materials, including rigid plastics and metals."
As technology advances, the creation of the physical part will
require less input and will become a more trivial task.7" As such, the
process of creating the part on the computer and turning it into a
physical part can be separated by vast distances.79 Much like what is
being done with software, computer files containing the parts that
were created in the United States can be sent abroad using a golden
76. One method of creating parts, which is more traditional, involves sending a
file containing a digital representation of a part to a machine that removes excess
material from a solid block of raw material until only the desired part remains. See
Patrick Waurzyniak, Rapid Metal, Manufacturing Engineering, Nov. 2003, at 49, 50
(discussing CNC machining, which is a method of creating parts using traditional
machines, such as mills and lathes, that are controlled by computers). Another
method involves sending a file containing a digital representation of a part to a
machine that adds raw material layer by layer until the desired part is created. This
process is sometimes known as three-dimensional printing, and could be seen as a
great advancement over traditional manufacturing techniques. See id. at 53
(describing rapid prototyping processes, which, among others, includes using ink-jet
printer technology where, instead of using ink, the machine prints with metal).
77. See id. at 49, 54 (indicating that materials available for rapid prototyping range
from plastics to metals such as "high-strength [metal] alloys, including titanium and
Inconel").
78. One company offers a service called "From CAD to Steel Directly," where a
three-dimensional model created on any CAD software can be inputted directly into
its machines and transformed from a digital part to a physical part. See id. at 53
(describing one company's "direct manufacturing" process, which is like rapid
prototyping except that the parts are made from the material that is desired for final
production, rather than a nonfunctional prototype material); see also supra note 73
(indicating that need for human intervention in the manufacturing process is nearly
eliminated). Additionally, the development of simulation software is an advance in
CNC manufacturing technology that allows designers to determine if their parts are
physically capable of being created using CNC machines, allowing a smoother
transition from CAD file to physical part. See Jeff Werner, Simulation Ensures
Machining Accuracy: Saves Programming Time, Frees Up Machines, Tooling &
Production, July 2004, at 30, 32 (describing creating "virtual manufacturing models"
and using software to run simulations of the machining process, which can also be
used to "check the capabilities and limitations of the machine" that will be used to
create the part); see also Tambascio, supra note 75, at 38-39 (indicating that
simulations can be used to determine if there will be problems in the final
manufacturing stage so that changes can be made while still in the "virtual stage"
before any physical machining takes place, thereby saving time and money). It is also
possible to conduct advanced analysis simulations using CAD software, including
interference checking to determine if assemblies will fit together properly; stress,
heat, and vibration simulations to locate weaknesses in the components; and
kinematics studies that animate the models to determine how they will operate, which
will allow engineers to perfect the components, all before a single part is ever
physically created. See Andrew Anagnost, Redesigning the Design Department,
Machine Design, July 8, 2004, at 84, 84-85.
79. See Glenn Kennedy, Web-Based Services for MCAD: Internet Makes
Training, File Translation, and Prototyping More Accessible, CADalyst, Feb. 2003, at
43, 44 (describing that, after CAD files are provided over the internet, one rapid
prototyping company provides a service such that, "[w]hen you're ready to order click
a button, and your model is delivered the next day at no extra charge").
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master or an encrypted electronic transfer, allowing the parts to be
replicated abroad.8"
This background information is helpful in facilitating an
understanding of how patent law and technology relate to each other.
The next part of this Note discusses how the courts have already
begun to apply the law to some of these new technologies."1
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW
While the case law applying § 271(f) to software and virtual
component technology is certainly sparse, controversy over whether §
271(f) should apply to software has begun to appear in the federal
district courts.82 Over the last two years, at least three district courts
have considered whether the exportation of software gives rise to
infringement liability under § 271(f). 83 The Federal Circuit has also
very recently weighed in on the debate over whether § 271(f) should
apply to software in its opinion in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp.84 While the Federal Circuit held that § 271(f) applies to
software,85 the opinion may have left some issues unresolved.
However, in order to fully understand and resolve the issues
surrounding the application of § 271(f) to software and virtual
components, it is necessary first to examine the federal district court
cases that have applied § 271(f) to software. In addition to the district
court cases, the Federal Circuit decision in Pellegrini v. Analog
Devices, Inc." requires some discussion because it may have an impact
on how § 271(f) is applied to software and virtual components. With a
background discussion of Pellegrini and the district court cases
provided in Parts II.A-D, Part II.E then discusses arguments both in
support of, and in opposition to, the application of § 271(f) to software
and virtual components. Lastly, Part II.F examines the Federal
80. See id. at 43-44 (indicating that, once a CAD file is received, a physical part
can be created).
81. See infra Parts II.A-D.
82. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004); Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supp. 2d 550
(E.D. Va. 2003); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Ill.
2003), affd, Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005). The district court in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.
held under one theory of liability that memory and application programs are
components and that the combination of those components with a processor outside
the United States is infringement under § 271(f). NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
Ltd., 261 F. Supp. 2d 423, 431 (E.D. Va. 2002). On appeal, however, the Federal
Circuit found infringement under § 271(a), and therefore, did not find it necessary to
address the § 271(f) issue. NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1366-
67 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
83. See supra note 82.
84. No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005).
85. Id. at *14.
86. 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 642 (2004).
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Circuit opinion in Eolas, followed by an analysis of its implications in
Part III.A.87
A. Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (The District Court
Case)
In Eolas Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,88 Eolas sued
Microsoft for patent infringement, claiming that Microsoft had
incorporated Eolas's invention into units of Windows with Internet
Explorer.89 Microsoft then moved to prevent the units that were
produced and sold outside of the United States from being included in
the damage assessment.9"
The court first concluded that the final assembly, when Internet
Explorer was installed onto the hard drive of a computer, occurred
outside of the United States, and that, therefore, there was no liability
under § 271(a).91 The court then analyzed Microsoft's actions under §
271(f).92
Microsoft was shipping Windows source code on computer disks
known as golden masters to foreign original equipment manufacturers
("OEMs"). 9 The OEMs were then replicating new units of Windows
using the single golden master.94 The replicated code was then
installed on a computer disk or hard drive, which was supplied by the
foreign OEMs.95 Microsoft argued that the golden master, which itself
was not installed on any computer system, was not a component of the
patented invention within the meaning of § 271(f).96
The court began its analysis by analogizing this case to the chemical
compound case of W.R. Grace.97 Microsoft argued that the golden
master is more like a chemical formula than the ingredients used for
making a chemical compound.98 However, the court disagreed,
holding that source code is more like an ingredient, because the
desired result is a "compound product of the programmable machine
(a computer) and Windows code[, which] is made from code and
87. See infra Part III.A.
88. 274 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Il. 2003), affd, Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.,
No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005).








97. Id. (discussing W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316
(D. Del. 1999)); see also supra notes 41-45.
98. Eolas Techs., Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d at 973-74.
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hardware together." 99 The court held that Microsoft's actions could
give rise to infringement liability under § 271(f).' °
After a verdict in Eolas's favor, Microsoft asserted, in a motion for
JMOL, that the Federal Circuit's newly issued opinion in Bayer A. G.
v. Housey Pharmaceuticals, Inc. required a modification of the court's
decision to allow the foreign sales of software to be included in the
damages calculation. 10' Bayer involved patents covering methods of
identifying substances that had an effect on particular proteins, which
could in turn be used to develop new drugs."° The Eolas district court
noted, "[i]n Bayer, the Federal Circuit found that the process patent at
issue did not fall within the parameters of 35 U.S.C. Section 271(g)
because it yielded only intangible information and not a physical
product.' ' 0 3 Microsoft maintained that the "physical" requirement of
Bayer should apply and, because the source code is intangible
information, the court should reverse its decision. ' The judge
rejected this argument, stating as follows:
For the reasons laid out in my August 1, 2003 opinion, I disagree.
The source code contained on the "golden master" is not intangible
information but is instead a real and substantial part of the final
product. Because I find that the source code present on the "golden
master" is not intangible information, Bayer does not affect my
decision. 10 5
The court denied Microsoft's motions to exclude foreign sales from
the calculation of damages. 1 6
B. Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp.
In Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp.,107 a case very similar to
Eolas, Microsoft again moved to exclude units of software replicated
outside of the United States from being included in a damages
calculation.'08 Imagexpo accused Microsoft of exporting infringing
NetMeeting software. 109 The software was first developed in the
99. Id. at 974.
100. Id.
101. Bayer A.G. v. Housey Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2004 WL 170334, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 15, 2004), affd in part, vacated in part, Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No.
04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005) (challenging the district
court's interpretation in Eolas of § 271(f) based on the Federal Circuit's decision in
Bayer).
102. See Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1369.
103. Eolas, 2004 WL 170334, at *4.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at *9.
107. 299 F. Supp. 2d 550 (E.D. Va. 2003).
108. Id. at 551; see supra Part II.A (discussing the facts of Eolas).
109. Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
[Vol. 732828
PA TENT INFRINGEMENT PREVENTION
United States and then, as in Eolas, it was sent to foreign-based
replicators on golden masters.11
The court addressed Microsoft's assertion that it could not be held
liable under § 271(f) because software could not be considered a
component.1 Microsoft, relying on the decision in Enpat, maintained
that "the term 'component' denotes a tangible, physical element of a
patented device, commonly associated with an apparatus claim.11 2 In
Microsoft's view, the "exported software code is a template" and "it
merely exports the template itself and not some tangible, physical
object."' 13 Microsoft therefore claimed it could not be held liable for
infringement under § 271(f). 114
Imagexpo first challenged Microsoft's arguments by asserting that
there was "no legal basis for Microsoft's attempt to engraft a
tangibility requirement into the definition of 'component.""' 5
Imagexpo further argued that the computer code contained on the
golden master is the "functional nucleus of the finished computer
product.""16
The court ultimately disagreed with Microsoft and denied its
motion to bar damages under § 271(f)." 7 In the court's opinion, "the
'golden master' and the electronic codes supplied by Microsoft to its
overseas representatives constitute[d] 'components' under 35 U.S.C. §
271(f)."' 8
C. AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.
In AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp.,19 AT & T sued Microsoft for
infringing an AT & T patent 20 by selling products containing speech
signal compression and decompression software.'21 The question
before the court was whether foreign-replicated copies of the
software, which were created from either a golden master or an
encrypted electronic transmission, could be included as part of the
damages under § 271(f). 122
The court first addressed Microsoft's argument that the software
was "merely 'intangible information,' and thus not a 'component' as
110. Id. at 551-52; see supra Part II.A (discussing the facts of Eolas).
111. Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
112. Id.; see supra notes 53, 56-58, 62 and accompanying text (discussing Enpat, Inc.
v. Microsoft Corp., 6 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
113. Imagexpo, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
114. Id.




119. No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
120. U.S. Reissue Patent No. 32,580 (issued Jan. 19, 1988).
121. A T & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *1 n.1.
122. Id. at *1.
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contemplated by Section 271(f).' 1 23 However, the court recognized
that "[iut is well-established.., that software can be a component of a
patented invention or infringing device.' ' 24  Next, it considered
Microsoft's request that it narrowly construe the term "component" in
§ 271(f) to exclude software. 25 The court declined to adopt such a
narrow interpretation, finding "no limitation of the term
'components,' either in the statutory text or in the legislative history,
to machines or other structural combinations.1' 2 6 The court cited
W.R. Grace,12 7 which found § 271(f) liability for supplying chemical
compounds,2 8 and Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co.,
129
which found that paper, glue, and blueprints were components under
§ 271(f),130 as support for not reading such a limitation into the
statute.'
However, in light of the Federal Circuit's decision in Bayer,
Microsoft urged the court to find a tangibility requirement in §
271(f).1 32  In Bayer, "the Federal Circuit stated that the term
'component' in section 271(g) 'appears to contemplate a physical
product."" 33 The AT & T court first referred to that statement in
Bayer as dicta and then held that it was not applicable to § 271(f)
because "(1) Bayer only applies to Section 271(g); and (2) the
'information' or 'data processing' that resulted from a patented
process in Bayer is completely unrelated to the software or object
code at issue here.', 134
The court then dealt with Microsoft's attempt to analogize its
software to a "'mold' for tires."'3 5 The court ultimately found this
analogy unpersuasive:
Microsoft argues that its software, like the foreign-molded tires,
cannot be said to be components of the patented combination
"supplied" from the United States because Section 271(f) looks to
the place from which the "component" in question was made and
supplied. Unlike the tires that are manufactured from a mold,
however, the software here has already been manufactured in, and
123. Id. at *4.
124. Id.
125. Id. at *5,
126. Id.
127. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316 (D. Del. 1999);
see supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
128. W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 320-21.
129. 144 F. Supp. 2d 188 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); see infra notes 209-11 and
accompanying text.
130. Moore, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
131. AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *5.
132. Id. at *6.
133. Id. (citing Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1376-77 (Fed.
Cir. 2003)).
134. Id. (footnote omitted).
135. Id. at *7.
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supplied from, the United States and is only copied abroad-the
software is not a mold for the creation of another separate type of
component. 136
The court was of the opinion that "the software itself is the
component, or the 'tire,' rather than a mold."'
1 37
D. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.
The decision in Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc.'38 is one of the
more recent Federal Circuit cases to interpret § 271(f).1 39 However,
Pellegrini did not deal with software technology; rather, the matter of
first impression before the court was whether instructions or
corporate oversight could be a component under § 271(f).40
Pellegrini claimed that a line of the defendant's integrated circuit
chips called "ADMC" chips infringed on its patent for a brushless
motor drive circuit.' Pellegrini contended that, among other things,
"Analog is incorporated in the United States and has executive,
marketing, and product line responsibilities for ADMC products; that
Analog conceived and designed the ADMC products; that Analog is
the exclusive manufacturer of ADMC products; [and] that Analog
makes all development and production decisions for ADMC
products."'4 2 Additionally, Pellegrini asserted that "Analog receives
purchase orders from and invoices customers worldwide for ADMC
products and increases production levels for ADMC products in
response to those purchase orders.', 4  However, none of the
infringing chips were physically manufactured in the United States.'"
The question before the court was whether
components that are manufactured outside the United States and
never physically shipped to or from the United States may
nonetheless be "supplie[d] or cause[d] to be supplied in or from the
United States" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) if those
components are designed within the United States and the
instructions for their manufacture and disposition are transmitted
from within the United States.1
45
The court ruled that "'[S]uppl[ying] or caus[ing] to be supplied' in §
271(f)(1) clearly refers to physical supply of components, not simply
136. Id.
137. Id. (discussing how rubber is added to a mold to create a tire).
138. 375 F.3d 1113 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 642 (2004).
139. Id. at 1115-16.
140. Id. at 1116-18.
141. Id. at 1114.
142. Id. at 1116.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1117.
145. Id. at 1115 (alterations in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000)).
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to the supply of instructions or corporate oversight." '146 The court held
that, even though Analog may have been "giving instructions from the
United States that cause the components of the patented invention to
be supplied," the fact that the components were not physically present
in the United States prevented liability from attaching under §
271(f)(1). 14
7
An examination of the recent cases reveals that courts have
attempted to adapt the law to accommodate developments in
technology, and some interesting arguments applying § 271(f) have
emerged from the opinions. 14  Part ILE explores these and other
arguments in further detail to illustrate some of the issues surrounding
the application of § 271(f) to new technologies.149
E. Discussion of the Arguments
This Part II.E provides further development of the arguments both
in support of, and in opposition to, extending § 271(f) coverage to
include software and virtual components.150  These arguments,
however, are based on the case law prior to the recent Federal Circuit
decision in Eolas. The implications of Eolas for these arguments are
discussed in Part III.A.'5 '
The discussions of the individual arguments begin with an
application of the argument to software technology, followed by an
adaptation of the argument to virtual component technology. There is
very little case law that directly applies to virtual components.152
Thus, this Note discusses the arguments regarding software, and then
applies those arguments, by analogy, to virtual component
technology. 53
146. Id. at 1118 (alterations in original). The court stated that "Analog does not
make. use. sell, or offer to sell ADMC products in the United States .... Analoe also
does not supplv ADMC chips in or from the United States, and does not cause
ADMC chips to be supplied in or from the United States. Thus.... § 271(f)(1) is
inapplicable." Id.
147. Id. at 1118-19.
148. See supra Parts II.A-D.
149. See infra Part II.E.
150. While the Federal Circuit may have adopted some of the arguments with
respect to software on "golden masters" in Eolas, it is important to examine both
sides of the debate to determine whether § 271(f) may be applied to virtual
components and how future courts will apply the Eolas decision.
151. See infra Part III.A.
152. Arguably, Pellegrini involved one aspect of virtual component technology;
however, the court did not address the issue in its holding. See supra notes 69-70.
153. The arguments addressed here are mainly based on the federal district court
opinions in Imagexpo, Eolas, and AT & T, which apply § 271(f) to software. See supra
Parts I.A-C. Any predictions about the implications of the Federal Circuit opinions
in Eolas and Pellegrini are reserved for discussion infra Part III.A. For a discussion of
additional arguments that may apply to software and § 271(f) infringement liability,
see Fisch & Allen, supra note 34.
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1. Arguments for Limiting Application of § 271(f) to Software and
Virtual Components
a. The Term "Component," Under § 271(f), Contemplates a Physical
Part
One argument that has been made is that "the term 'component'
denotes a tangible, physical element of a patented device" 54 and that
there needs to be some physical product present. 55  There is,
debatably, some support for this argument in the history of the
statute."6 Congress enacted § 271(f) specifically to overrule the
Supreme Court's holding in Deepsouth.'57 Deepsouth involved the
export of machine parts-which are physical, tangible elements-for
assembly abroad. 5  Therefore, as the reasoning goes, because
Congress was only addressing this specific case, it was not
contemplating that software-which is intangible information-would
be covered by § 271(f).' 59
This argument could withstand the holding of W.R. Grace.6 ° In
W.R. Grace, the defendant argued that because Deepsouth only
involved machine parts, § 271(f) should be limited to cover structural
components.' 6 ' The court rejected this argument, finding no reason
for distinguishing between machine components and chemical
154. Imagexpo, L.L.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 299 F. Supo. 2d 550, 552 (E.D. Va. 2003).
155. AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004) ("Microsoft argues that its infringing software must be a
'physical product' to constitute a 'comtonent' under Section 271(f)."); see Eolas
Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2004 WL 170334, at *4 (N.D. 111. Jan.
15, 2004), afjd in part, vacated in part, Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-
1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005) (discussing Microsoft's argument
that a "physical product" requirement should apply). However, it is worth noting
here that the statute uses the phrase "component(s) of a patented invention," 35
U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000), and not "components of a patented product," which is what it
seems Microsoft was arguing, AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *4. The two may not
mean the same thing because "invention" is arguably broader than "product." See
infra notes 247-48 and accompanying text (indicating that the term "invention" is
broad).
156. See W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 320-21 (D.
Del. 1999) (discussing § 271(f) and its legislative history to determine whether the
statute is confined to the specific facts of Deepsouth, thereby limiting application only
to mechanical or structural components); Fisch & Allen, supra note 34, at 576-77
(indicating that there is some support in the legislative history for limiting § 271(f) to
tangible components); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing
legislative history of § 271(f)).
157. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
158. See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1972).
159. Fisch & Allen, supra note 34, at 576-77; see also AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at
*5 (citing W.R. Grace and considering the legislative history of § 271(f) to determine
the statute's applicability to software).
160. W.R. Grace, 60 F. Suno. 2d at 321: Fisch & Allen, supra note 34, at 576-77.
161. See W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 320.
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components.'62 However, the W.R. Grace court merely found no
distinction between various tangible components.'63 It could be
argued that the holding does not directly bear on the issue of whether
there should be a distinction between tangible and intangible
components.164
The argument against application to software would also apply in
the case of virtual components because of their similar "intangible"
nature. 65 Virtual components are merely digital representations of a
physical part. 166 They are really just intangible information, much like
software. 67 Until the component is "printed out" and converted into
physical form, it remains intangible. 68 Applying the same reasoning
for not including software, it could equally be argued that virtual
components were not what Congress intended § 271(f) to cover. 169
b. Software Sent Abroad Is More Like a Formula and Not a
Component
Another argument is that the golden master, the disk the software is
exported on, is more like a formula than a component.17' Likening
software to a chemical formula, the reasoning is that the disk is only a
set of instructions for making a chemical compound, and not the
ingredients for that compound.'71 The code on the disk is not a part of
the final product-which is the patented invention-but, like a
chemical formula, it is only instructions given to a computer. 172
Therefore, the golden master containing the code cannot be a
component of the patented invention.73
Again, because of the similarities in their nature, this chemical
formula analogy could also apply in the case of virtual components. 174
162. See id. at 320-21.
163. See id.
164. See Fisch & Allen, supra note 34, at 577 & n.96 (citina W.R. Grace in sumport
of the oroposition that "§ 271(f) generallv has been applied by courts only to tangible
items manufactured in the United States"); see also AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *5.
165. See supra text accompanying note 71. For a discussion of how both software
and virtual components can be "manufactured" on computers and how they can be
sent vast distances via electronic transmission for replication, see supra notes 72, 75,
79-80, 122, 136 and infra note 234 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Part I.B.2.
167. See supra note 75.
168. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 20, 111-12 and accompanying text.
170. Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
affd, Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 2, 2005).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 974 (discussing Microsoft's argument analogizing the golden master to a
chemical formula). Additionally, the court noted that a "chemical formula ... is not
part of any product." Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra text accompanying note 71. For a discussion of how both software
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The computer file containing the virtual component is not a part of
the final output, which would be a physical part, but rather, the file is
analogous to instructions that are given to the "printer.' 17 5  The
printer then uses the file to create the part.'76 Like the golden masters
used to create copies of software, the file is not a component of the
patented invention; it is only used to create it, and therefore, would
not give rise to § 271(f) liability. 77
c. Software Sent Abroad Is More Like a Mold for Creating Foreign-
Replicated Copies
The golden master containing the software can also be likened to a
template, much like a mold for a tire. 178 When the golden master is
sent abroad it is used by the foreign replicators to create additional
copies, and it is these copies that are actually incorporated into the
computers. 79 The golden master is simply a template from which all
other copies are created. 8 ° It could be argued that there should be no
infringement under § 271(f) because, just as a mold is not part of any
tire, the golden master is not part of any computer, and therefore, is
not a component of a patented invention.'81
This analogy would also apply to virtual components. The virtual
component file is only used to create physical copies of the
components, and is not itself a component.'82 Likewise, as with any
mold, the virtual component file is not incorporated into the final
product, and therefore cannot be a component of the invention. 83
d. Policy Dictates that § 271(f) Should Not Apply to Software
Some opponents have argued that permitting § 271(f) to apply in
the case of software exportation would stifle American competition
and virtual components can be "manufactured" on computers and how they can be
sent vast distances via electronic transmission for replication, see supra notes 72, 75,
79-80, 122, 136 and infra note 234 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 72, 74, 76 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 72, 74, 76 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 72, 74, 76 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 170-73
and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing the argument
Microsoft made in A T & T).
179. See supra notes 91, 93-95 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 91, 93-95 and accompanving text.
181. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
182. See supra notes 72, 74, 76 and accompanying text.




and innovation." Applying § 271(f) in this way would prevent
American companies from competing with a patent holder in foreign
markets.185 In order to compete, companies would either have to
move the creation of the golden masters abroad, or in the worst case,
the entire development of the software would have to be moved
abroad as well. 6 This could potentially have a negative impact on the
American job market. 87 The result would be either that American
companies simply could not compete in foreign markets once there is
a United States patent issued on an invention, or that they would have
to move their entire development operations abroad so that the
golden master was never in the United States. 188 This prevents
domestic manufacturers from competing with a patent holder, while
foreign companies can compete without infringing the United States
patent.18 9
By analogy, it would seem that § 271(f) liability would also pose the
same problem for American companies who develop virtual
components. Instead of just having the parts "printed out" abroad,
they would have to move the entire development of the virtual
components abroad. 9 ' This would mean moving engineering and
design operations abroad. 9' As such, domestic companies would not
be able to compete in foreign markets with other American
companies who only possess a United States patent. 92
2. Arguments Supporting Application of § 271(f) to Software and
Virtual Components
a. Section 271(f) Is Not Limited to Tangible Components
There is no clear indication in the language or the legislative history
of § 271(f) that Congress intended to limit its coverage to physical
components only.'93 According to one federal district court, "[t]he
plain language of the statute limits its application only to a
184. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8; see also Marc J. Pensabene & Jonathan
Berschadsky, Software Patent Damages for Foreign Sales: Have the District Courts
Gone Too Far?, Computer & Internet Law., July 2004, at 23, 27.
185. See A T & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8.
186. See id.; Pensabene & Berschadsky, supra note 184, at 27.
187. See Pensabene & Berschadsky, supra note 184, at 27.
188. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8 & n.8; Pensabene & Berschadsky, supra
note 184, at 27.
189. See A T & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8.
190. See id.; Pensabene & Berschadsky, supra note 184, at 27.
191. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8 & n.8; Pensabene & Berschadsky, supra
note 184, at 27.
192. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8; Pensabene & Berschadsky, supra note
184, at 27.
193. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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'component of a patented invention.""94  The legislative history
indicates that the addition of § 271(f) was "to avoid encouraging
manufacturing outside the United States."'95 Following the logic in
W.R. Grace, limiting § 271(f)'s application to tangible components
"would be tantamount to legislating additional language to a
statute."'96 Additionally, in Diamond v. Diehr, a case that opened the
door for the patenting of software, the Supreme Court stated that, "in
dealing with the patent laws, we have more than once cautioned that
'courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions
which the legislature has not expressed."" 97  Additionally, the
legislative history indicates that § 271(f) should be adaptive to
changing technologies.' 98
Under this rationale, there is no reason why § 271(f) should not
apply to software.' 99 The United States Patent & Trademark Office
194. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Intercat, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 2d 316, 321 (D. Del.
1999).
195. Section-By-Section Analysis: Patent Law Amendments of 1984, 130 Cong.
Rec. 28,065, 28,069 (submission of Rep. Kastenmeier), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5827, 5827.
196. W.R. Grace, 60 F. Supp. 2d at 321.
197. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981) (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980) (citation omitted)). In 1978. the Supreme
Court stated in Parker v. Flook that "[lit is our duty to construe the patent statutes as
thev now read .. and we must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend
patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen bv Congress." Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584, 596 (1978). Using this cautious approach, the Court determined that the
computer program at issue was not patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2000). Flook, 437 U.S. at 595 n.18. Interestingly, this narrow approach to statutory
interpretation was based on the decision in Deepsouth. where the Court stated that it
would "recuire a clear and certain signal from Congress" before it would expand
patent protection based on "ambiguous statutory language." Deepsouth Packing Co.
v. Laitram Corp, 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (adopting a narrow interpretation of 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) and holding that manufacturing the components of an invention was
not sufficient for infringement because the defendant did not "make" the patented
invention until it was fully assembled). However. in 1980. the Court in Diehr
retreated from its view in Flook. stating that "'courts should not read into the patent
laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed."' Diehr, 450
U.S. at 182, 192-93 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308 (citation omitted), and then
interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 101 broadly enough to allow for the patenting of a computer
program); see also John T. Soma et al., Software Patents: A U.S. and E.U.
Comparison, 8 U. Balt. Intell. Prop. L.J. 1, 14-15 (1999). The Court's change in
position in Diehr, a departure from Flook and Deepsouth, along with Congress's
enactment of § 271(f), which closed the loophole created by the Court's narrow
interpretation of § 271(a) in Deepsouth, supports the argument that courts should not
read limitations and conditions into § 271(f) as well.
198. Section 271(f) was enacted as part of an attempt to make the patent laws more
"responsive to the challenges of a changing world." 130 Cong. Rec. 28,065, 28,069
(statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). The court in AT & T indicated that excluding
software from protection would frustrate this legislative intent. See AT & T Corp. v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
199. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *5; Fisch & Allen, supra note 34, at 580, 582
("Any attempt to add a 'tangibility' requirement to § 271(f) not only ignores the clear
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Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (the "MPEP") treats software
as patentable subject matter, indicating that "[wihen a computer
program is recited in conjunction with a physical structure, such as a
computer memory, [Patent & Trademark] Office personnel should
treat the claim as a product claim. ' '2W Moreover, merely storing the
software on a golden master would seem to be enough to make it
patentable. 2°1  The court in AT & T noted that "[ilt is well-
established ... that software can be a component of a patented
invention or infringing device. ' '"2 1 Since software is itself a patentable
component, it could be argued that it should also be treated as a
component under § 271(f), even if it is not necessarily "tangible. ' 23
It is somewhat more difficult to make this argument apply to virtual
components because, unlike software, there is no explicit provision
addressing the patentability of virtual components. 2°  However, it is
important to realize that virtual components do represent patentable
components, just in digital form.20 5 Recognizing this aspect of virtual
component technology might permit an argument for equal treatment
of both software and virtual component technologies under § 271(f).
One could argue that because software has qualified for § 271(f)
protection, even if it may be "intangible," the similarities between the
technologies should lead to similar treatment under § 271(f).2 16
caselaw holding that an apparatus can encompass a software component, but also
effectively 'turns back the clock' on the evolution of patent law.").
200. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure §
2106(IV)(B)(1)(a) (2003) [hereinafter MPEP].
201. In In re Beauregard, the Federal Circuit issued a precedential order remanding
the case for further proceedings in accordance with the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks' concession that "'computer programs embodied in a tangible medium,
such as floppy diskettes, are patentable subject matter."' In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d
1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (quoting the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
202. AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *4. However, the court also seemed to indicate
that software code stored on a tangible medium might be considered a tangible
component for § 271(f) purposes. See id.
203. See supra notes 123-31 and accompanying text.
204. There is no provision in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
("MPEP") for virtual components like there is for software. See MPEP, supra note
200, § 2106(IV). However, the Patent & Trademark Office has been allowing claims
to comouter program signals embodied in a carrier wave. which may provide some
support for the patentabilitv of virtual components. See U.S. Patent No. 6.857.071
(issued Feb. 15. 2005) ("[Claim] 13. A computer program signal embodied in a carrier
wave comprising...."). If claims for programs embodied in carrier waves are
statutory, it may be possible to claim a product, which has been modeled as a virtual
component, as a signal embodied in a carrier wave. These types of claims are still
relatively new and a full analysis of their implications is outside of the scope of this
Note. For a more in-depth discussion of the ramifications of allowing "carrier wave"
claims in the context of software, see Jeffrey R. Kuester et al., A New Frontier in
Patents: Patent Claims to Propagated Signals, 17 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.
75 (1998); and Dana M. Wilson, Note, The Propagated Signal Claim: What Is It and
What Are the Infringement Consequences?, 6 J. Intell. Prop. L. 425 (1999).
205. See supra Part I.B.2.
206. There is no explicit tangibility requirement in the statute or legislative history.
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However, while it has not been made in direct support of
application of § 271(f) to software, 7 there is another argument that
could possibly allow § 271(f) to cover both software and virtual
components. This argument requires a broad reading of § 271(f) to
include detailed designs or blueprints as "components." One of the
early cases that discussed § 271(f) indicated that there was a question
as to whether § 271(f) covered the "provision of plans. '20 8 In a more
recent case, a federal district court in Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard
Register Co. considered this issue.2 9  The defendant, Standard
Register Company ("SRC"), was accused of infringing a patent for a
type of mailing envelope because it exported supplies to, and
manufactured the envelopes in, Switzerland.210 The court, finding the
defendant liable for infringement, held that "under section 271(f)(1),
SRC representatives supplied 'a substantial portion' of the accused
forms' components when they brought the necessary paper, glue, and
blueprints with them from the United States." '211 The court's inclusion
of the "blueprints" seems to indicate that blueprints could be
considered a component of the patented invention.212 Like blueprints,
a virtual component is the information necessary to create a physical
part.2 13 Therefore, under a broad reading of § 271(f) that included
blueprints as components, a virtual component could also be
considered a component. An argument supporting the inclusion of
See supra notes 21, 23-24 and accompanying text. These technologies are also very
similar because they are both software-based. See supra text accompanying note 71.
Additionally, even if software is patentable when it is in a tangible medium, when sent
by encrypted electronic transmission it may be considered intangible, and therefore
may not necessarily qualify for patent protection. See Kuester et al., supra note 204, at
75-76 (indicating that while a "propagated signal" claim is currently being treated as
patentable, there are no statutes or case law supporting the "propagated signal"
claim). But see supra note 204 (indicating that "carrier wave" claims are being
permitted in patents). However, some courts have found that liability may arise when
software is sent by electronic transmission, which would make the argument for equal
treatment under § 271(f) stronger because there is very little difference between
sending software data electronically and sending virtual component data
electronically. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8 (finding that software sent via
electronic transmission may give rise to § 271(f) liability); see also supra Part I.B
(discussing software and virtual component technologies).
207. However, without fully discussing its implications, the court in AT & T did cite
the holding in Moore that "paper, glue and blueprints" were components under §
271(f). AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *5 (citing Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register
Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195 (W.D.N.Y. 2001)).
208. Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., No. CV 72-1231, 1986 WL 4795, at *31
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 1986), vacated as moot, 839 F.2d 663 (Fed. Cir. 1988). However,
the court ultimately did not rule on the issue because it found that the shipments
occurred before § 271(f) became effective. See id.
209. Moore, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 195.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 195-96. The court mentioned the blueprints several times throughout
the opinion. See id. at 190, 193, 195-96.
212. See id.
213. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing virtual component technology).
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blueprints as components, along with the fact that there is no explicit
tangibility requirement in the statute, would seem to enlarge the scope
of § 271(f) enough to provide coverage for both software and virtual
components.
b. Software Sent Abroad Is Not a Formula, but Rather an Ingredient
The counterargument to the chemical formula analogy requires
viewing software as an ingredient. 14 Software cannot be used by
itself; it has to be "added" to a computer system to achieve the desired
result.215 Another distinction is that a "chemical formula can be
memorized (as many complex recipes are) and discarded, [whereas]
source code has to be installed, never to be discarded." '216 Therefore,
there is a strong argument that software is not like a formula and
should be covered by § 271(f).
The argument that a virtual component is not a formula relies on
accepting the concept, fully discussed below, that the component has
already been manufactured on the computer.217 Under this reasoning,
the virtual component is not the formula for creating the part, because
the part is already created.
c. Software Sent Abroad Is Not Simply a Mold for Creating Foreign-
Replicated Copies
The counter to the tire mold analogy218 recognizes that the software
being sent abroad is more like the tire than the mold.219 The software
is the patented invention and that is exactly what is being exported-
the only process being performed abroad is copying.220 Unlike a tire
mold, which requires the addition of rubber to create the patented
invention - a tire- the software is complete by itself.2 2
1
214. See supra Part II.E.1.b.
215. See Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Ill. 2003),
affid, Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 2, 2005); see also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(indicating that the addition of software to a general purpose computer creates a
special purpose computer).
216. Eolas, 274 F.Supp. 2d at 974.
217. See infra Part II.E.2.c.
218. See supra Part II.E.l.c.
219. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
220. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004) ("[T]he object code is originally manufactured in the United
States....").
221. See id. ("Unlike the tires that are manufactured from a mold, however, the
software here has already been manufactured in. and suolied from, the United States
and is onlv copied abroad-the software is not a mold for the creation of another
separate type of component.").
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Some courts have been willing to recognize that software is made
first in the United States.22 Using this rationale, some courts have
found that software qualifies for § 271(f) protection.2 3 They have also
been willing to find infringers liable for foreign-replicated copies,
refusing to adopt a rule that would allow infringers to avoid liability
by exporting only a few complete copies of the software in order to
benefit from the efficiencies of making multiple copies abroad.2 4
Under the theory that software is made in the United States, it could
be argued that software is not like a mold for a component, but
actually is the component, and therefore § 271(f) should apply.225
This argument is a little more difficult to make in the case of virtual
components. Admittedly, raw material such as plastic needs to be
added before a physical part is created from a virtual component,
which might indicate that a virtual component is analogous to a
mold. 26 However, a virtual component is not really a mold, because a
mold is a distinct object separate from the part it creates; it is more
like its negative image.27 A virtual component is more analogous to
the "tire" than the mold that is used to create it-the only difference
is that it exists as a computer file.228 This is similar to the copying of
software. 229 However, instead of storing the files on a hard drive, the
222. See id. ("[T]he object code is originally manufactured in the United
States...."); Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Ill.
2003), affd, Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005) ("[S]ource code is a made part of a computer product. In
contrast, a chemical formula is discovered rather than made, and is not part of any
product.").
223. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *7. This approach of focusing on steps
completed in the United States may be further supported by the recent Federal
Circuit decision in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., where the court emphasized
the word "wholly" when citing a past decision for the proposition that "'infringement
of [a patent right] cannot be predicated on acts wholly done in a foreign country."'
NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1366 (citing Rotec Indus., Inc. v.
Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citation omitted)).
224. See A T & T. 2004 WL 406640. at *7.
225. See id. ("Unlike the tires that are manufactured from a mold. however, the
software here has already been manufactured in. and supplied from, the United States
and is only copied abroad-the software is not a mold for the creation of another
separate type of component.").
226. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (describing how a mold is used
to create a separate tvpe of component): see also AT & T. 2004 WL 406640. at *7
("Unlike the tires that are manufactured from a mold, however, the software here has
already been manufactured in, and supplied from, the United States and is only
copied abroad-the software is not a mold for the creation of another separate type
of component.").
228. The virtual component is not a negative image of the part-it is the actual part
because the machines print exactly what is modeled in the CAD file. See supra notes
74, 78 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
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virtual component is stored in plastic or metal. 30 It is in this crucial
respect that a virtual component is not like a mold.
Additionally, under the same theory that software is "made" in the
United States, courts may be willing to accept an argument that
virtual components are also "made" to some degree in the United
States.231 As noted above, advances in CAD software allow engineers
to complete the vast majority of the work involved in creating a
component by simply using a computer.232 Furthermore, advances in
manufacturing equipment have made turning a CAD file into a
physical part a more trivial task.233 In essence, the engineer has
manufactured the component on a computer. 34 The only difference is
that the virtual component is the intangible form of a physical part.235
Therefore, virtual components could be differentiated from a mold
because they are digital representations of the actual component, not
a separate and distinct object that is used to create other parts.
d. Policy Supports Application of § 271(f) to Software
It could be argued that patent law policy supports the application of
§ 271(f) to software in order to prevent infringement by the
exportation of components of the invention.236 Preventing this kind of
activity arguably would not have any more of a negative impact on
innovation than preventing infringement by domestic sales.237
Infringing is, in essence, copying what has already been invented.238
The software being exported is infringing on an already patented
invention.2 39 The purpose of the patent laws is to promote progress by
230. See supra notes 76-77, 79 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 136, 145-46 and accompanying text (indicating that part of a §
271(f) inquiry focuses on where the components were being made or manufactured).
232. See supra Part I.B.2. Running analysis simulations using CAD software allows
engineers to refine the components on a computer so that, by the time the parts are
"printed out," there is little left to be done and no human intervention is needed to
create the physical parts. See supra notes 72, 78 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 72-73, 78 and accompanying text.
234. At least one court has stated that computer code can be "manufactured." See
AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 2004) (indicating that "the object code is originally manufactured in the
United States"). Because computer code is intangible but capable of being
"manufactured," it could be argued that, by analogy, a virtual component could also
be "manufactured" on a computer. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing the amount and
type of work that can be completed when creating virtual components using a
computer).
235. See supra Part I.B.2.
236. See supra notes 24, 198 and accompanying text.
237. See AT & T, 2004 WL 406640, at *8 (indicating that Microsoft's policy
concerns about being able to compete in foreign markets "are better addressed
through manufacture of non-infringing goods").
238. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607
(1950) (indicating that copying, even with insubstantial changes, is still infringement).
239. See supra Parts II.A-C (discussing the Eolas, Imagexpo, and AT & T cases).
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protecting inventors, not copiers.240 Without this protection, an
infringer would be allowed to "'capture[] the foreign markets from the
patentee ... [and] to reap the fruits of the American economy-
technology, labor, materials, etc.-but would not be subject to the





The same arguments could also be made in support of virtual
components. The policies of the patent laws support extending §
271(f) because otherwise an infringer would be allowed to benefit
from the American economy, using skilled labor and technology, such
as computers and software, to create the virtual components.
242
However, the infringer could avoid the patent laws by simply having
the components "printed out" abroad. This is analogous to simply
having components assembled abroad, as was done in Deepsouth, a
practice prohibited by § 271(f). 243
F. The Federal Circuit Resolves Some Questions
In March 2005, the Federal Circuit issued its opinion in Eolas
Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., which has answered some of the
questions regarding § 271(f) liability for the exportation of software.2"
One of the most critical questions addressed was whether software is a
component of a patented invention, which the court answered in the
affirmative.245
To determine whether software is a component for § 271(f)
purposes, the court first analyzed the language of the statute.246
Section 271(f) refers to "components of a patented invention." 247 The
court recognized that both the term "patented invention" and the
definition of "invention" provided in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a), 101, which
includes "'any new and useful process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter,"' were "broad and inclusive., 248  From this
broad statutory language, it was concluded that § 271(f) was not
240. Protection is given to innovators in order to comply with the objective of
promoting "the Progress of Science and useful Arts. bv securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
241. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corn., 406 U.S. 518, 534 (1972) (Blackmun,
J.. dissenting) (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939
(5th Cir. 1971)).
242. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text (discussing how engineers use
computers to create virtual components).
243. See supra notes 15, 20 and accompanying text.
244. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. Mar. 2, 2005).
245. Id. at *14 ("In sum, the language and history of section 271(f)(1) as well as this
court's law protecting software inventions support this court's holding that section
271(f)(1)'s 'components' include software code on golden master disks.").
246. Id. at *12.
247. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000).
248. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 100(a), 101).
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limited to "patented 'machines' or patented 'physical structures' or
to "'machine' components or 'structural or physical' components," but
rather, "every form of invention eligible for patenting falls within the
protection of section 271(f)" and "every component of every form of
invention deserves the protection of section 271(f). 249
The court further rejected any argument that the legislative history
limited the scope of § 271(f).25o It was not persuaded to limit § 271(f)
to the specific facts of Deepsouth merely because § 271(f) was enacted
in response to Deepsouth, stating the following:
Microsoft and amici argue that Congress' use of "components"
must be identical to the "components" of the patented invention in
Deepsouth. In other words, since Deepsouth dealt with the
components of a physical machine, section 271(f)'s "components"
are limited to physical machines. This argument finds no support in
the language or history of the statute.251
The Eolas court instead held that the legislative history indicated that
the purpose of § 271(f) was to "correct[] a loophole for all forms of
patented inventions. '252
After concluding that § 271(f) applied to "every form of
[patentable] invention" and "every component of every form of
invention," the court needed to determine whether software was an
eligible invention and whether software code was a component. 253 It
held that software qualified as a patentable invention, both as a
process type and product type invention. 254 Next, in deciding whether
software code on a golden master is a "component," the court stated
as follows:
A "component" of a process invention would encompass method
steps or acts. A "component" of an article of manufacture invention
would encompass a part of that construct. Because a computer
program product is a patented invention within the meaning of Title
35, then the "computer readable program code" claimed in [the
patent] is a part or component of that patented invention.255
Moreover, the court noted that it "accords the same treatment to all
forms of invention" and that there is no "principled reason for
treating process inventions different than structural products. 2 56 It
recognized that, "[o]n a functioning computer, software morphs into
hardware and vice versa at the touch of a button." '2 57 Therefore, the
249. Id.
250. See id. at *13.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at *12.
254. Id.
255. Id. (citation omitted).
256. Id. at *13.
257. Id.
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court held that "sound policy.., counsels against varying the
definition of 'component of a patented invention' according to the
particular form of the part under consideration, particularly when
those parts change form during operation of the invention as occurs
with software code. 258
Lastly, the court addressed what effect its recent decision in
Pellegrini would have on applying § 271(f) to software.259 In
Pellegrini, the court stated that "'[s]uppl[ying] or caus[ing] to be
supplied' in § 271(f)(1) clearly refers to physical supply of
components, not simply to the supply of instructions or corporate
oversight. '' 26 Microsoft argued that the holding in Pellegrini "imposes
a requirement that components in section 271(f) are physical," in
effect asking the court "to add the word 'physical' in front of
'components' in section 271(f)." 261
The Eolas court rejected this argument, noting that "the language
of section 271(f) does not impose a requirement of 'tangibility' on any
component of a patented invention. 262  It reasoned that, "[i]f the
statute intended to limit the reach of 'components of patented
inventions,' it would have expressly included some narrowing
restriction., 263  The court further clarified its holding in Pellegrini,
stating that Pellegrini "did not address the meaning of the
'components' language in section 271(f)."12  Rather, the court stated
that "Pelligrini [sic] requires only that components are physically
supplied from the United States. Pelligrini [sic] does not impose on
section 271(f) a tangibility requirement that does not appear
anywhere in the language of that section."26
III. SELECTION OF A PROPER INTERPRETATION
This part first discusses the possible effects that the recent Federal
Circuit decision in Eolas Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.266 may
have on § 271(f) interpretation. It then recommends and provides
support for a broad interpretation of § 271(f) in light of software and
virtual component technology.
258. Id.
259. Id. at *14.
260. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 642 (2004) (second and third alterations in original).





266. Id. at *1.
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A. Possible Implications of Eolas
The Federal Circuit opinion in Eolas may have far-reaching effects
on the interpretation of § 271(f). In addition to holding that software
on a golden master is a component,267 the opinion may provide a
stronger foothold for arguments in support of applying § 271(f) to
virtual components, 268 and in favor of providing protection for process
patents.269
1. Protection for Process Patents
The inclusion of process patents certainly seems to indicate a
change in § 271(f) jurisprudence.270 It appears that the Federal Circuit
opinion in Eolas may have overruled the federal district court
decisions in Enpat and Synaptic Pharmaceutical, where § 271(f) was
interpreted to exclude process patents.27' While the Federal Circuit
opinion in Standard Havens did not explicitly state why § 271(f) did
not apply, subsequent courts seemed to have interpreted that decision
to mean that § 271(f) does not apply to process patents as a class.272
267. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
268. See infra Part III.A.5.
269. See infra Part III.A.1.
270. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing prior cases where courts have refused to apply
§ 271(f) to process patents).
271. See supra Part I.A.3.
272. See Enpat. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.. 6 F. Supp. 2d 537. 539 (E.D. Va. 1998)
("Like the asphalt process in Standard Havens . p. olaintiffs' patent describes the
steps reouired to accomolish a particular task rather than the comoosition of a
patented ohvsical product.... We conclude that plaintiffs' patent has no
'components' for purposes of § 271(f)."); see also AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp..
No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640. at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5. 2004) (noting that method
patents have been determined not have components and therefore do not implicate §
271(f)); Synaptic Pharm. Corp. v. MDS Panlabs, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 452, 464 (D.N.J.
2002) ("Given these court's [sic] determinations that § 271(f) does not applv to
method patents, this Court will refrain from extending § 271(f) liability to MDS's
activities with regard to Svnaptic's assav [processi patents. As a result, the Court
determines that MDS cannot have violated § 271(f) .... " (citing Standard Havens
Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360. 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1991): Envat. 6 F.
Supp. 2d at 539: Aeroroup Int'l. Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks. Ltd., 955 F. Supp. 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1997))); Fisch & Allen. supra note 34. at 571-72 & n.69 ("[Clourts have
held that method patents do not implicate § 271(f) because they lack anv
'components."' (citing Standard Havens. 953 F.2d at 1374; Synaptic Pharm., 265 F.
Supp. 2d at 464; Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539)). But see Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *13 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005) (indicating that a
process patent could be covered by § 271(f)). Notably, a reading of Standard Havens,
in light of Eolas, indicates that some courts may have misinterpreted Standard
Havens' holding. In Standard Havens, the court noted that the patent in issue "claims
a method for producing asphalt, not the apparatus for implementing that process.
Thus, the sale in the United States of an unclaimed apparatus alone does not make
Gencor a contributory infringer of the patented method." Standard Havens, 953 F.2d
at 1374. After indicating that there was no infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b), (c),
or (g), the court finally concluded that it did not find § 271(f) implicated. Standard
Havens, 953 F.2d at 1374. Therefore, it appears the court merely ruled that the
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The court in Enpat held that § 271(f) did not apply to process patents,
concluding that process patents lacked components, and therefore, §
271(f) could not apply.2 73
However, in Eolas, the court explicitly stated that § 271(f) applies
equally to process patents.274 The court also specifically noted that
software claimed as a process is patentable, and indicated that it
would be covered by § 271(f).27 This would seem to overrule Enpat,
which held that exporting software covered by a process patent did
not implicate § 271(f), but the court failed to cite Enpat or any of the
other opinions that dealt with § 271(f) and process patents.276
While it appears that § 271(f) liability will now attach to process
patents, some issues still remain. The Eolas court went on to discuss
what would qualify as a component of a process patent, stating that
"[a] 'component' of a process invention would encompass method
steps or acts., 27 7 Accordingly, exporting the "method steps or acts" of
a process patent would give rise to § 271(f) liability.278 This seems
simple enough, except for one obvious problem: How does one
export "method steps or acts"? This problem is further complicated
by the court's reading of Pellegrini, which indicates that, while
components themselves do not have to be physical, they do have to be
"physically supplied" from the United States.279
So what could this all mean? It seems that part of the reasoning in
Enpat, which concluded that exporting physical components used in
carrying out a process patent are not components for § 271(f)
purposes, is still good law.28 It would appear that exporting a
machine that is used to facilitate a patented process would not infringe
apparatuses for implementing a process are not components, not that all process
patents lack components. See id.
273. See Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539; see also supra note 55 and accompanying text
(discussing Synaptic Pharm. and its citation of Enpat).
274. See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
276. Compare Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12-13 (determining that exportation of
software could give rise to infringement of U.S. Patent 5,838,906 (issued Nov. 17,
1998) under § 271(f), and finding no reason for treating process and product
inventions differently), and U.S. Patent 5,838,906 (issued Nov. 17, 1998) ("[Claim] 1.
A method for running an application program in a computer network environment,
comprising .... ), with Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539 (finding that exportation of
software could not give rise to infringement of U.S. Patent 5,548,506 (issued Aug. 20,
1996) under § 271(f)), and U.S. Patent 5,548,506 (issued Aug. 20, 1996) ("[Claim] 1. A
method executed by a computer system as part of a computer program .....
277. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12.
278. See id.
279. See id. at *14.
280. See Enpat, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 539 ("While it is true that any process involves the
use of physical objects, this alone is not enough to bring a method patent within the
purview of § 271(f) ...."); see also supra notes 57-59, 255 and accompanying text.
This conclusion also seems to be consistent with the holdin2 in Standard Havens. See
Standard Havens Prods.. Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
1991); see also supra note 272.
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because the machine is not a "method step[] or act[]. '2 81 However, it
is likely that the holding in Enpat, indicating that exporting software
that is covered by a process patent does not implicate § 271(f), is now
overruled.282 One reason that could be derived from the Eolas
opinion is that, with software process patents, the "method steps or
acts" of the process are embodied in the software code-which is
stored on the golden master-and the golden master is supplied from
the United States. Therefore, under Eolas, it appears that § 271(f)
infringement liability can attach for exporting software covered by a
process patent. 83
2. Protection for Design Patents
The Eolas court used some very broad language, stating that "every
form of invention eligible for patenting falls within the protection of
section 271(f)." 284  This language could be interpreted as broad
enough to protect design patents under § 271(f).
In arriving at its broad interpretation of § 271(f), the court relied on
Title 35 definitions for guidance.285 Title 35 also includes a provision
for design patents, § 171, which states the following: "Whoever
invents any new, original and ornamental design for an article of
manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions
and requirements of this title., 286 Section 171 goes on to state that
"[tihe provisions of this title relating to patents for inventions shall
apply to patents for designs, except as otherwise provided." 87 From
this language, it would seem that the subject of a design patent is an
invention, and thus, because "every form of invention eligible for
patenting falls within the protection of section 271(f)," 288 § 271(f)
should apply.
Unlike with process patents, the court did not explicitly state what
the components of a design would encompass. 289  Therefore, the
question of whether design patents are capable of having components
needs to be resolved before § 271(f) would apply. Take, for example,
Design Patent No. D501290, a design patent for a hat with a built-in
black light system. 290 It would seem that this design has components.
281. The Federal Circuit's conclusive statement that "[a] 'component' of a process
invention would encompass method steps or acts" seems to foreclose an
interpretation that would include components that are merely utilized by the process.
See Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12; see also supra note 280.
282. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
283. See supra Part II.F.
284. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12; see supra note 249 and accompanying text.
285. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12.
286. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
287. Id.
288. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12.
289. See id.
290. See U.S. Patent No. D501,290 (issued Feb. 1, 2005).
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If the hat and black light system were exported separately with the
intent that they be assembled abroad, § 271(f) liability might attach.
It would appear that all the requirements would be met: (1) this
would be a form of invention eligible for patenting; 91 (2) these would
be components of an eligible form of invention;292 and (3) these
components would be physically supplied from the United States.293
Admittedly, however, this argument would most likely fail. This is
because a design patent only protects the appearance of an article,
rather than its physical embodiment.2 94 Therefore, it could be argued
that a design patent lacks components. 295 Thus, it appears that Eolas
will not affect the holding in Aerogroup International, Inc. v. Marlboro
Footworks, Ltd., and design patents will not come under the purview
of § 271(f).2 96
3. Pellegrini's Limited Meaning
The Eolas court also took the time to clarify its holding in
Pellegrini.29' The court stated that the holding of Pellegrini only dealt
with the interpretation of the "supplies or causes to be supplied in or
from the United States, 298 language of § 271(f). 299 It made clear that
Pellegrini and its use of the word "physical" did not affect what could
be considered a component for § 271(f) purposes. 00 Not only did the
court say that components do not have to be "physical," it further
indicated that components do not even have to be tangible.3 1
However, the court did uphold Pellegrini for the proposition that
components must be "physically supplied from the United States.
30 2
This raises an interesting question: How does one physically supply
an intangible component? At first glance, this may seem impossible,
but from the court's opinion, it appears that supplying software on a
golden master would be one such instance.3 3 Perhaps another
possible way of answering this question, besides supplying some type
291. See supra notes 249, 286-88 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
294. See Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871) ("It is the appearance itself,
therefore, no matter by what agency caused, that constitutes... the contribution to
the public which the law deems worthy of recompense.").
295. See id. at 525-26.
296. See Aerorouo Int'l. Inc. v. Marlboro Footworks. Ltd.. 955 F. Supp. 220, 232
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to apply § 271(f) to a design patent); see also supra notes
49, 53 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
298. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
299. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
301. Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *14
(Fed. Cir. Mar. 2, 2005); see also supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
302. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *14.
303. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
2005] 2849
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of golden master, could be the supply of blueprints.3°4 If the courts
adopted an interpretation of § 271(f) that included blueprints as
components, exporting blueprints, as was done in Standard Register,
could be interpreted as physically supplying an intangible
component.3 °5
4. Electronic Transmission Loophole
According to the court in Eolas, Pellegrini still requires that
"components [be] physically supplied from the United States, '30 6 and
this may have left another loophole intact. The Eolas opinion only
stated that "section 271(f)(1)'s 'components' include software code on
golden master disks., 37  The court did not address the issue of
whether exporting software by using electronic transmissions, perhaps
over the internet, would give rise to § 271(f) liability.3 8 However, a
plain reading of the court's opinion tends to indicate that electronic
transmission would not be covered because sending something over
the internet arguably does not satisfy the physically supplied
requirement.
If this is the correct interpretation of Pellegrini, then a loophole in §
271(f) still exists. Software manufacturers in the United States could
avoid liability by simply exporting the software by electronic
transmission rather than by using a golden master. 30 9 This certainly
seems to be an erroneous result. It is unclear exactly what effect
Pellegrini will have in this context, but at least one district court has
held that software exported by electronic transmission could impose §
271(f) liability.310
304. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
305. See Moore U.S.A. Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 144 F. Supp. 2d 188, 195
(W.D.N.Y. 2001); see also supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
306. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *14 (emphasis omitted).
307. Id.
308. See id. at *12. However, at least one commentator, as early as 1998, indicated
that transactions over the internet may give rise to § 271(f) infringement liability. See
Keith E. Witek, Software Patent Infringement on the Internet and on Modern
Computer Systems Who Is Liable for Damages?, 14 Santa Clara Computer & High
Tech. L.J. 303, 380-81 (1998); see also Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace:
Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 32-47
(1993) (discussing patent infringement on computer networks more generally).
Additionally, claims to computer programs embodied in carrier waves would, if
accepted by the courts, make transmitting software electronically an infringing
activity. See Kuester et al., supra note 204.
309. However, claims to computer programs embodied in carrier waves would
provide patent protection to electronic transmissions of software directly. See Kuester
et al., supra note 204; see also supra note 308 and accomoanving text.
310. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004 WL 406640, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004).
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5. Future of Software and Virtual Components
Under Eolas, it is clear that software exported on a golden master is
a component and invokes § 271(f) liability.311 The type of patent that
covers the software is not necessarily determinative, because § 271(f)
was interpreted to apply to "every form of invention," including both
process and product claims.312 This opinion is favorable to U.S. patent
holders who want to prevent other domestic manufacturers from
exporting infringing software.
In addition, there is also some language in the opinion that is
favorable to the application of § 271(f) to virtual components. First,
the court stated without limitation that "every component of every
form of invention deserves the protection of section 271(f)."3 13 The
court went on to note that "the language of section 271(f) does not
impose a requirement of 'tangibility' on any component of a patented
invention." '314 The court also indicated that it was not good policy to
"vary[] the definition of 'component of a patented invention'
according to the particular form of the part under consideration."315
This language would seem to bring virtual components within the
scope of § 271(f). However, the protection of virtual components may
not be so straightforward because the court also took the time to
differentiate software from a "prototype, mold, or detailed set of
instructions." '316 Therefore, before virtual components would be
protected, they would also have to be differentiated from a
"prototype, mold, or detailed set of instructions." However, as
discussed in Part II.E.2, there are arguments that indicate virtual
components are more than mere prototypes or molds.317
Virtual components are components of a patented invention in
digital form.31 Because § 271(f) applies to any component in any
form, regardless of tangibility, they may now be covered. Eolas,
which applies § 271(f) to "any component" without the need for
tangibility, provides a stronger case for the application of § 271(f) to
virtual components.
B. Recommendations
Section 271(f) should be interpreted to provide protection against
the exportation of software and virtual components. The Federal
311. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
312. Eolas, 2005 WL 475391, at *12.
313. Id.
314. Id. at *14.
315. Id. at *13
316. Id. at *12.
317. See supra Parts II.E.2.a-c; infra Part III.B (setting forth arguments that
differentiate virtual components from mere prototypes, molds, or detailed sets of
instructions).
318. See supra Parts I.B.2, II.E.2.
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Circuit's decision in Eolas, which applied § 271(f) to software on
golden masters, is a step in the right direction and should be followed
by future courts.319 However, the Eolas decision should be expanded
to cover virtual components and the exportation of components by
electronic transmissions as well. The policy of protecting American
inventors supports the adoption of this approach.32
To determine whether the courts should apply § 271(f) to the
activities of an American company, the courts should focus on what is
being done domestically.32' In the case of software, if the software is
being created domestically and only the final steps of replication are
being conducted abroad, the courts should realize that the software is
in fact being manufactured in the United States.322 The same is true
with virtual components. If components are being fully created on a
computer domestically, with only the final step of "printing out" the
parts being conducted abroad, courts should realize that, in some
respects, the components have been manufactured in the United
States.323  After recognizing that manufacturing processes are
occurring in the United States, courts should conclude that § 271(f)
applies. Otherwise, domestic copiers "would then be allowed to reap
the fruits of the American economy-technology, labor, materials,
etc.-but would not be subject to the responsibilities of the American
patent laws.
324
The courts should also not categorize software and virtual
components as mere molds or chemical formulas.325 Software is
patentable subject matter and virtual components represent
patentable subject matter, except that they exist in a computer in
digital form.326 Software is patentable when stored on a tangible
medium 327 and the same could be said for virtual components. There
is little difference between storing software in a tangible medium by
burning it onto a CD3 28 and storing a virtual component in a tangible
319. See supra Part II.F.
320. See supra Part II.E.2.d.
321. See NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 392 F.3d 1336, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(emphasizing that acts wholly done outside the United States do not give rise to
infringement liability). This may indicate that, as long as some portion of the
manufacturing process occurs in the United States, liability can attach. See supra
notes 222-23 and accompanying text.
322. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Part I.B.2 and text accompanying notes 231-35.
324. Deepsouth Packine Co. v. Laitram Corp.. 406 U.S. 518. 534 (1972) (Blackmun,
J.. dissentinR) (quoting Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d 936, 939
(5th Cir. 1971)).
325. See supra Parts II.E.2.b-c.
326. See supra text accompanying note 71. For a discussion of how both software
and virtual components can be "manufactured" on computers and how they can be
sent vast distances via electronic transmission for replication, see supra notes 72, 75,
79-80, 122, 136, 234 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Part I.B.1.
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medium by sending it to a three-dimensional printer.329 In this
respect, software and virtual components are not like a mold-a
separate object used to create other parts-or a chemical formula-
instructions used to create the compounds-because software and
virtual components are the actual components of the patented
invention that simply have not yet been stored in a tangible medium.
The courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that
software is deserving of § 271(f) protection 30 and future courts should
find similarly for virtual components.
The Federal Circuit in Eolas was on the right track when it refused
to read a "tangibility" requirement into the statute. 3 It was also
deliberate in not interpreting Pellegrini to require that components be
"physical" for § 271(f) purposes.332 However, while the court was
strongly opposed to inserting the terms "tangible" and "physical"
before the word "component" in § 271(f), the court was content to
interpret the Pellegrini holding to insert the word "physical" in front
of the word "supply" in the statute.33 The judicial insertion of the
word physical in § 271(f)-that is, the physical supply requirement of
Pellegrini-should not be left intact. While this Note does not
necessarily advocate a rule that would allow mere corporate oversight
to be considered a component, the Pellegrini court should have
limited its holding to excluding corporate oversight as a component,
instead of adopting a bright line rule that components must be
physically supplied.3 4 The reason is that this requirement may cause
electronic transmissions to fall outside the scope of § 271(f), giving
rise to another loophole whereby copiers can export their software
and virtual components without fear of infringement liability.335
Therefore, the Pellegrini "physical supply" requirement should not be
left intact. Future courts should follow Eolas's strong position against
reading limitations into the statute, and not apply a physical supply
test.336
329. See supra Part I.B.2.
330. See supra Parts II.A-C, II.F.
331. See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 146, 261-65 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 146, 264-65 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 146, 264-65 and accompanying text.
335. See supra Part III.A.4.
336. There also appears to be some tension between the positions adopted by both
the Supreme Court in Diehr and the Federal Circuit in Eolas, where the courts were
opposed to reading limitations into the patent laws, and the Federal Circuit in
Pellegrini and Bayer, where the court inserted a "physical" limitation into § 271(f) and
§ 271(g), respectively. Compare Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981), and
Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 04-1234, 2005 WL 475391, at *14 (Fed. Cir.
Mar. 2, 2005), with Pellegrini v. Analog Devices, Inc., 375 F.3d 1113, 1118 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 642 (2004), Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367,
1371-73 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also supra notes 102-03, 146, 197. It is unclear if, or how,
the Eolas decision will affect future courts' interpretations of Pellegrini and Bayer.
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Some commentators, however,-have warned against a rule that does
not strictly adhere to some tangibility requirement in order for §
271(f) to apply.337 There is some concern that if § 271(f) liability could
attach without a tangibility requirement, a designer or software
engineer could infringe a patent by simply traveling to another
country with the mere knowledge or memorization of how to design a
part or write software that would infringe a United States patent.338
This result could be avoided if courts simply focused, as this Note
suggests, on the actions occurring domestically. While the designer
has knowledge of how to infringe the patent-under the theory that
software and virtual components are "manufactured" on computers-
once the designer arrived at her foreign destination she would still
have to go through the process of "manufacturing" the software or
virtual component before it could be further replicated. In this
scenario, § 271(f) should not apply because the software or virtual
component would have to be "remanufactured" abroad by
transforming the designer's knowledge into source code or a CAD
model. However, when the software or virtual components are
created in the United States and then exported for the final step of
replication, the courts should find that the patented invention has
been infringed under § 271(f).
Some may also be concerned that direct infringement liability could
attach simply by developing some software or by designing a part
using CAD software which happened to be the subject of another's
patent. However, this too would not be a problem because this Note
advocates that courts treat the software and virtual components at
issue here as components only. Using the example of virtual
components, a designer would not be liable for infringement until the
product is "made"; that is, until the CAD file is printed out and
converted into a physical part.339 A virtual component is merely a
component and, therefore, a designer would not infringe the patent
because domestic liability does not attach until the invention is
assembled.34°  There is a difference in result, however, if the
components were sent abroad in an attempt to avoid the patent laws,
because this is the type of activity § 271(f) is designed to prevent.
337. See Pensabene & Berschadsky, supra note 184, at 27.
338. See id.
339. The district court in Eolas cited the Deepsouth opinion as good law on the
point of whether § 271(a) liability had attached, stating that "[u]nder Section 271(a),
there is a requirement that there be an 'operable assembly' of the infringing products
[domestically] before there can be liability" meaning that the Deepsouth court
interpreted "the word 'makes' as used in Section 271(a)" so that "unassembled
component parts do not infringe a... patent claiming the assembled whole." Eolas,
274 F. Supp. 2d. at 973 (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
527-29 (1972)). Therefore, a domestic company would not infringe a United States
patent by simply creating a CAD drawing.
340. See supra note 339.
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Keeping software and virtual components out of the scope of §
271(f) creates a loophole, much like the one that § 271(f) was
originally intended to close.341 It would allow domestic companies to
copy the inventions of United States patent holders, compete with
them in foreign markets, and take advantage of the American
economy, all the while not being subject to infringement liability.342
This would diminish some of the patent holders' exclusionary rights,
as well as the incentive to innovate.343
Lastly, adoption of these recommendations would not have a
catastrophic impact on domestic industry.3" While applying § 271(f)
to software and virtual components may have a negative impact on
domestic infringers, this is not unlike any other case of
infringement.345 Preventing infringement would either cause the
infringers to develop new noninfringing products, cause them to seek
licenses from the patent holders, or simply prevent them from
capturing part of the market share and thereby prevent injury to the
patent holder's business.
CONCLUSION
As technology changes, patent law must be able to adapt. Under
the current state of technology, the vast majority of the work
necessary to manufacture components can be completed on
computers, without actually creating a physical part. Unlike the days
when parts were made by skilled artisans using hand tools, most, if not
all, of the skill required to manufacture components today-either
software or parts that are modeled using CAD-is employed during
the computer phase. Parts can be fabricated with little effort and at
remote locations. One researcher has stated that "[tjhe impact of [this
technology] on everyday life will be so profound, changing the way
products are designed, manufactured and distributed, that it can be
described as the next industrial revolution." '346
341. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
342. See supra Part II.E.2.d. This is a particularly insidious form of infringement
because a competing domestic manufacturer could infringe every claim in a patent
and then, in a single occurrence, export the software or virtual component so that
thousands upon thousands of copies of the invention could be created abroad, thereby
creating competition in foreign markets. Even if the patent holder managed to
successfully sue this domestic infringer, without § 271(f) liability the patent holder
would only be entitled to recover for a single occurrence of infriniement-the one
copy that was exported. See AT & T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ.4872, 2004
WL 406640, at *7 & n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2004) (indicating that an infringer would
be liable for every unit of software that was exported, but without § 271(f) liability,
the infringer would not be liable for the foreign-replicated units).
343. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Part II.E.2.d.
345. See supra Part II.E.2.d.
346. Phil Dickens, Industrial Revolution Rapidly Approaching, Metalworking
Production (May 4, 2004) (discussing rapid prototyping/manufacturing technology), at
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If the courts or Congress disregard the work that is employed
during the computer phases, inventors' patent rights will be
diminished. Another loophole may develop, allowing domestic
copiers, using the resources of the American economy, to take away
foreign sales from a patent holder simply because the copier performs
the now trivial task of mass-producing its copies abroad.
While it appears that the Federal Circuit's Eolas opinion has
resolved the issue of whether § 271(f) applies to software on a golden
master, the opinion still leaves the issue unresolved with respect to
virtual components and exportation using electronic transmissions.347
However, Eolas is a step in the right direction and perhaps future
courts will resolve any remaining issues and provide a workable
framework that will both be able to adequately adapt to new
technologies and protect patent holders.
http://www.mwponline.com/story.aspx?uid=bd6d32a9-ea7e-4308-9d18-98a2af7aa44.
347. See supra Parts III.A.4-5.
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